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ADEA Front Pay Awards:
Who Should Determine the Amount?

In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).' The purposes of the ADEA are "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age; [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.'" These purposes are achieved through ADEA provisions which make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire,
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his or her employment based on the individual's
age.3
The ADEA states that its remedial provisions are enforceable through either governmental intervention4 or a civil ac~ a civil action under the
tion by any aggrieved p e r ~ o n .In
ADEA, "any court of competent jurisdiction" is authorized to
render "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the pur~
the relief granted by courts to
poses of this ~ h a p t e r . "Among
ADEA plaintiffs is that of "front pay." Front pay is the present
value of future income that a n improperly discharged employee
would have earned if she were to continue working for her
employer for the balance of her working life.?
The ADEA does not, however, specifically provide for the
award of front pay to age discrimination victims,8 and many
courts rebuffed early attempts by plaintiffs to obtain front pay
awards under the ADEA.' Nevertheless, every federal circuit
1. 29 U.S.C.
621-634 (1988).
2.
Id. § 62103).
3.
Id. $ 623(a).
4.
Id. § 62603).
Id. 626(c)(l).
5.
Id.
6.
7.
Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir. 1990).
8.
See generally Anthony F . Cottone, Comment, Settling the Front Pay Controversy Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.122 (1984) (discussing whether front pay is an
appropriate remedy under the ADEA).
9.
See, e.g., Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1982) (front
pay awards not available in age discrimination suit); Price v. Maryland Casualty
c0.7 391 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Miss. 19751, affd, 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977).
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court that has considered the issue now holds that front pay is
a remedy available to plaintiffs in ADEA suits.'' The issue
currently facing the various circuits is whether the amount of a
front pay award should be determined by juries or by judges."
The circuits are clearly divided on this issue.12
This comment examines the nature of front pay awards in
ADEA proceedings. Part I1 sets forth the background leading
up to the present split among the circuits regarding the determination of the amount of a front pay award. Part I11 summarizes the present case law in support of allowingjuries to determine the amount of front pay to award in ADEA suits. Part IV
examines the reasoning of those courts which hold that the
amount of front pay should be determined by judges rather
than juries. Part V analyzes the jury trial provisions of the
Seventh Amendment and of Supreme Court case law. Part V
concludes that juries, rather than judges, should be permitted
to determine the amount of front pay in ADEA actions.

The remedial provisions-of the ADEA13 do not provide explicitly for front pay as a remedy in age discrimination suits.
Instead, the granting of fkont pay arises from the notion that
courts should seek "to make persons whole for injuries suffered
on account of unlawful employment di~crimination."'~

10.
Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985);
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Maxfield v.
Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 795-96 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057
(1986); Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 429 (1991); Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742
F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984); McNeil v. Economics Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 111,
118 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber
Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672
F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 US. 859 (1982); EEOC v. Prudential
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
946 (1985); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 US. 1005 (1985).
11. See generally Richard J. Seryak, Front-Pay Awards in Employment Litigation: An Issue for the Judge or Jury? 17 EMPLOYEEREL. L.J. 131 (1991) (pointing
out split in circuits concerning whether judges or juries should determine amount
of ADEA front pay awards).
12.
Id.
13.
29 U.S.C. 8 626 (1988).
14. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (emphasis added).

ADEA FRONT PAY AWARDS

A. "Make Whole" Standard of Relief
The "make whole" standard of relief is conside
touchstone for courts in fashioning both legal and equitable
remedies in employment discrimination actions."15 Courts are
encouraged to use the ADEA's broad grant of remedial authority to re-create the circumstances which would have existed, or
rather persisted, but for the unlawful discrimination.16 To
that end, courts routinely award back pay to victims of age discrimination for damages they have suffered up to the time of
judgment." However, back pay does not make a n injured party whole for damages suffered, or which will be suffered, after
the time of judgment. Therefore, another remedy is required to
compensate an age discrimination victim for damages during
the gap between the final judgment and the time the employee
returns to gainful employment. In fact, the gap may extend
until the employee would have retired. Reinstatement of the
employee is a remedy which can fill that gap.
B. Reinstatement as a Remedy for Prospective Damages
The ADEA explicitly provides for the equitable remedy of
reinstatement of an employee to his former position with the
employer when the employee is wrongfully discharged on the
basis of age.'' Naturally, reinstating a n employee to his former position makes him "whole" by returning him to the same
economic position he occupied before being wrongfully discharged. The federal circuits agree with this proposition and
uniformly hold that reinstatement is the preferred form of
relief for prospective damages ADEA plaintiffs may suffer.lg
15. Bridget Flanagan, Comment, Front Pay as a Remedy Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 187 n.1 (1985) (citing
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976) (Title VII standard)).
"Victims of unlawful labor practices are entitled to be restored to the economic
position they would have occupied but for the intervening illegal conduct of an
employer." Id.
16.
Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982).
17. Flanagan, supra note 15, at 187.
18. "In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion . . . ." 29 U.S.C. $ 626(b) (1988) (emphasis
added).
19. Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1990) (" 'Reinstatement is generally the preferred remedy for a discriminatory discharge.' ") (quoting
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Reinstatement, however, is not possible in all cases. Courts
have recognized several circumstances under which reinstatement of a n age discrimination victim would be impossible or
undesirable. For example, requiring reinstatement of a n em- '
ployee may be undesirable if the relationship between the employer and the employee has become so hostile and antagonistic
as to be neither beneficial nor produ~tive.'~Furthermore, the
employee's former position of employment may have been filled
by another employee who is innocent of any wrongdoing; displacing the innocent employee simply perpetuates an injusreinstatement is not possible when a company
t i ~ e . ~Finally,
'
is no longer in business or has ceased to operate that portion of
its enterprise for which the wrongfully discharged employee
was qualified.22

C. Front Pay as an Alternative Remedy
If reinstatement of the employee is not feasible, a n alternative remedy must be found to fill the gap in the damage award
for injury suffered between judgment and the employee's retireIn fact, front pay is
ment. Front pay is such a n alternati~e.'~

Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989)); accord EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
763 F.2d 1166, 1171-73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985) ("[Rleinstatement is the preferred remedy under the ADEA and should be ordered whenever i t
is appropriate."); Cassino v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); McNeil v. Economics Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d
111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Blim v. Western Elec.
Co., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984).
20.
See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir.
1984) (employer-employee relationship may be "irreparably damaged by animosity
associated with the litigation").
21.
See, e.g., Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 120-22 (4th Cir. 1983)
(reversing supplemental order requiring employer to reinstate aggrieved employee
to position already filled by another employee); cf. Patterson v. American Tobacco
Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268-69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976) (involving
displacement of an employee in a racial discrimination case).
Chace v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 732 F. Supp. 605, 609 @. Md. 1990).
22.
An employee's health has also been cited as a si@cant factor in denying an age
discrimination victim's request for reinstatement. See, e.g., Houghton v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 627 F.2d 858, 865-67 (8th Cir. 1980) (affirming denial of reinstatement of test pilot due to expert testimony that he was unable to safely perform
the job).
23.
See, e.g., Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469-70
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989) ("district court's award of front pay in
this case was improper without a precedent finding that reinstatement was not
feasible"); Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales Inc., 789 F.2d 253, 261 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("[Wlhen circumstances prevent reinstatement, front pay may be an

ADEA FRONT PAY AWARDS
said to be given in lieu of r e i n ~ t a t e m e n tso
~ ~that the "make
whole" objective of the ADEA's remedial provisions is not frustrated.25
The federal circuits agree that the decision to grant or to
deny the remedy of reinstatement of an employee wrongfully
discharged on the basis of age rests with the judge? Such a
alternative remedy.") (citing Maxfield v. Sinclair Intl, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986)); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758
F.2d 1435, 1448-49 ( l l t h Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985) ("[Aln award of
front pay-ie., prospective lost earnings-may be an appropriate remedy in an age
discrimination suit because reinstatement would be impracticable or inadequate.");
Chace v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 732 F. Supp. 605, 609 (D. Md. 1990) ('When
reinstatement is inappropriate, the Court can consider front pay a s an alternative."); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1317 (N.D. Ill. 1990), reu'd on
other grounds, 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The alternative remedies of reinstatement or front pay are available in the event that some further award is necessary
to make the plaintiff whole.").
24.
Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., 940 F.2d 1429, 1438 ( l l t h Cir. 1991)
("prospective damages are awarded in lieu of reinstatement" when reinstatement is
not feasible); Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir.
1988) (front pay available "in lieu of reinstatement").
Note that a refusal by an ADEA plaintiff to accept reinstatement as a remedy
will not necessarily be fatal to his or her claim for front pay. If the ADEA plaintiff
"has reasonably rehsed reinstatement, frontpay [sic] is an available remedy under
the ADEA." O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551
( l l t h Cir. 1984); accord Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1203
(7th Cir. 1989); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553 (10th
Cir. 1988); Lemons v. ICM Mortgage Corp., No. 90-1211, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
19754, at *7 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
Furthermore, a failure by an ADEA plaintiff to include in his or her pleadings
a request for reinstatement or for front pay should not preclude a court from
granting either. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 638 (10th Cir.
1988). "The trial court 'shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor [a
final judgment] is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in the party's pleadings.' " Id. (quoting FED.R. CIV. P. 54(c)).
A few courts hold an opposite, although incorrect, view. " '[Flront pay' . . .
c a ~ o be
t awarded where no claim is made in the litigation for . . . reinstatement." Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (D. Me. 1986);
see also Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980).
25.
Reneau v. Wayne Griffm & Sons, Inc., 945 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1991)
("Since reinstatement may not be feasible, front pay may make the plaintiff
whole . . . ."); McNeil v. Economics Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (indicating that when reinstatement is infeasible
or inappropriate, front pay may be awarded to make the plaintiff whole).
26.
See Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 429 (1991); Burns v. Texas City Ref., Inc., 890 F.2d 747, 753 (5th Cir.
1990); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1203 (7th Cir. 1989);
Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 1989!, cert. denied, 493
U S . 1062 (1990); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir.
1988); Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1562 ( l l t h Cir. 1988); Fite
v. First T ~ M .Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 892 (6th Cir. 1988); Dominic v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1987); Cassino v. Reichhold

710

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW RJEVIEW [I992

decision is an exercise of the judge's equitable powers.27 Because front pay is given in lieu of reinstatemenean equitable
remedy-it follows that the judge should decide whether a n
award of front pay is warrantedz8 since the judge must determine that reinstatement is not feasible and that the employee
would be left less than "whole." Although the circuits concur
that a judge should decide whether to grant a n award of front
pay, they are split on whether the jury or the judge should determine the amount of front pay to award."

111. ALLOWINGJURIES
TO DETERMINE
THE AMOUNT OF FRONTPAYTO AWARD

A. Federal Circuits That Permit Juries to Determine
the Amount of Front Pay
Many of the federal circuits have struggled in deciding
whether judges or juries should determine the amount of front
pay to award in ADEA actions. Case law from seven circuits
has indicated that juries should set the amount. However, only
three of those circuits still clearly adhere to this rule, three
circuits have rejected the rule, and one circuit has vacillated.
and Ninths2 Circuits have held
The Third," Sixth:'
that juries should set the amount of front pay awards in ADEA
actions. At one time, courts in the Fifth,33 Seventh:* and
Chem. Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp.,
771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985).
27.
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 n.11 (1978) (judgment compelling reinstatement is clearly equitable).
28.
See, e.g., Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822-23 (5th Cir. 1990);
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984).
29.
See generally Seryak, supra note 11, at 134-35.
30.
See, e.g., Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 1989)
(affirming jury award of front pay).
31.
See, e.g., Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 (6th Cir.
1988).
32.
See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346-47 (9th Cir.
1987) (implicitly approving delegation of determination of amount of front pay to
jury but reversing the trial court due to a flawed jury instruction).
33.
The Fifth Circuit originally held in Hansard u. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling
Co., that "[ilf the trial court concludes that front pay is appropriate, then the jury
should determine the amount of damages." 865 F.2d 1461, 1470 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S.842 (1989).
34.
The Seventh Circuit determined that "[aluthority and reason both suggest
that while the decision to award front pay is within the discretion of the trial
court, the amount of damages available is a jury question." Coston v. Plitt
Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 1333 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987), (dicta) (citing Mafield v.
Sinelair Intl, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986);

ADEA FRONT PAY AWARDS
~ e n t h Circuits
~'
held that juries should determine the amount
of front pay; they have since repudiated that view,36indicating a clear trend away from allowing juries to determine the
amount of front pay t o award ADEA claimants.
Case law in the First Circuit suggests that juries should
set the amount of front pay. However, that case law has been
unsettled, even schizophrenic. The First Circuit initially held
that front pay was not an allowable remedy in an ADEA
suit;37however, the court later reversed that position, ruling
that front pay was available in lieu of rein~tatement.~'In its
first decision upholding an award of front pay to an ADEA
plaintiff, the First Circuit hinted, in dictum, that the amount of
front pay should be set by a judge.39But the First Circuit ap-

see also Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1318 (N.D. 111. 1990) (district
court in 7th Circuit) ("[Elven though front pay is a n alternative remedy to reinstatement, it is a legal remedy, not an equitable one.").
A district court in the Tenth Circuit held that "although the court deter35.
mines whether to award front pay, the jury properly decides upon the amount of
front pay in the event that the court ultimately frnds such damages recoverable."
Eivins v. Adventist Health Sys., 660 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D. Kan. 1987).
The Fifth Circuit reversed itself in 1990, holding that "[als an equitable
36.
remedy under federal law, we believe that it was within the district court's discretion to determine the amount of the front pay award." Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc,,
897 F.2d 815, 824 (5th Cir. 1990).
The Seventh Circuit decided in Graefenhuin v. Pabst Brewing Co. that front
pay is an equitable remedy. 870 F.2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming district
court's award of front pay); see also Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 105557 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing and remanding court's award of front pay for being
too speculative but permitting court to make determination of amount of front
pay).
The Tenth Circuit decided in Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co. that a judge
should set the amount of front pay. 941 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1991). The court
held:
Because the cases holding that the calculation of front pay is a jury question do so primarily by adhering,to earlier precedent assuming this was
the jury's function, we will follow the more reasoned line of authority . . .
which considers in detail the legislative history of the ADEA, the nature
of the remedies it provides, and the traditional function of the court and
jury.
Id. at 1426.
37.
Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1982).
38.
Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985).
39.
Id. "Future damages should not be awarded unless reinstatement is impracticable or impossible; the district court, then, hus discretion to award front pay.
Because future damages are often speculative, the district court, in exercising its
discretion, should consider the circumstances of the case, including the availability
of liquidated damages." Id. (emphasis added). At least one commentator believed
that the First Circuit would allow the amount of ADEA front pay awards to be
determined by judges rather than juries. Seryak, supra note 11, a t 138 n.15. The
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parently reversed its position on this point by upholding a 1989
decision in which the district court permitted a jury to determine the amount of front pay.40In upholding the decision, the
First Circuit remanded the case for a new calculation of the
amount of front pay that should be awarded!'
The court,
however, did not explicitly decide whether the jury should set
the amount of front payp2 it merely remanded the case for a
more appropriate calculation of da1nages.4~It would appear,
although not conclusively, that the First Circuit regards the
determination of the amount of front pay in ADEA actions as a
matter within the jury's discretion.

B. Reasoning of Courts That Permit Juries to Determine
the Amount of Front Pay
The circuits holding that juries should determine the
amount of front pay in ADEA suits have not offered any substantial reasoning in support of such a holding. They merely
assume that the responsibility of determining the amount of
front pay is within the scope of the jury's duties. The explanation of the Third Circuit in Maxfield v. Sinclair Internationar4 is typical. Mafield, a salesman for Sinclair, was forced to
retire one month after his sixty-fiffh birthday and was replaced
by a younger empl~yee.~'The jury concluded that Sinclair's
actions violated the ADEA? The court noted that reinstatement was the preferable remedy for the violation:'
but said
that front pay could be given in lieu of reinstatement since
reinstatement was not feasible.48The court then announced
that "[olf course the amount of damages available as front pay
This is the court's reasoning, in its entireis a jury que~tion.'"~
ty. Other decisions by the Third,50 Sixth5' and Ninth52 Cirreference to the district court's exercise of "discretion" indicated that the amount of
front pay awarded would be set by juries in the First Circuit. Id.
L ~ Mv. Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
40.
1989).
41.
Id. at 8-9.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 9.
44.
766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
45.
Id. at 790-91.
46.
Id. at 790-92.
47.
Id. at 796.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
See, e.g., Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 772 n.11 (3d Cir.

7051
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cuits are equally unenlightening. In short, none of the circuits
that permit juries to set the amount of front pay in ADEA
actions provide any analysis that can be examined for
soundness.
IV. ALLOWING JUDGES
TO DETERMINE
THE AMOUNTOF FRONT
PAYTO AWARD
A. Federal Circuits That Permit Judges to Determine
the Amount of Front Pay
In contrast to the cases allowing juries to determine the
amount of front pay awards in ADEA suits, courts in six federal circuits have held-and continue to hold-that such awards
should be set by the trial judge.53 These include the Courts of
Appeals for the Second,54 Fourth,S5 Seventh,S6 EighthP7
Tenth," and Eleventh5' Circuits.
'

1989) ("The determination of the amount of front pay necessarily involves some
imprecision. However, to permit the jury to undertake that calculation is not
reversible error . . . ."); Anastasia v. Schering Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 704-05 (3d Cir.
1988) (affirming jury award of front pay); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d
367, 374 (3d Cir. 1987).
51.
See, e.g., Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984)
("[Tlhis Court now holds that the approval of the prospective damage award of
$88,800 as returned by the jury was not an abuse of discretion."); Fite v. First
Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 1988) (relying on Davis to
allow jury to determine amount of front pay award).
52.
See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir.
1987) (permitting jury to establish amount of front pay).
53.
In addition, one circuit has reached the same result in a case involving
Louisiana's version of the ADEA. Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 824
(5th Cir. 1990) (determination of amount of front pay award within district court's
discretion).
54.
Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1987).
55.
Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F,2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 429 (1991) ("[Ilts award [front pay] and amount is one for the court sitting in
equity to consider and not the jury.").
56.
See, e.g., Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing
and remanding district court's award of front pay as too speculative but permitting
trial court to set the amount of front pay); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870
F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1989) (remanding case for reconsideration of events occurring
after trial but permitting trial court t o set the amount of front pay):
57.
See, e.g., MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (8th Cir.
1988) (affirming trial court's determination of amount of front pay); Brooks v.
Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court's
determination of amount of front pay).
58.
Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1991)
("follow[ing] the more reasoned line of authority" that judges should set the
amount of front pay awards in ADEA actions).
59.
See, e.g., Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., 940 F.2d 1429, 1438 n.20 (11th
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B. Reasoning of Courts That Permit Judges to Determine
the Amount of Front Pay
1. The leading case: Dominic

Dominic u. Consolidated Edison CO.,~'decided by the Second Circuit, is the leading case holding that a determination of
the amount of front pay in ADEA suits is an issue for the
judge? Dominic, the plaintiff, was fired by Consolidated Edison in violation of the ADEA.62The trial court decided that reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy in the case.63Instead, the court held that Dominic was entitled to front pay.64
The jury awarded the plaintiff $378,000 in front pay. The trial
judge, however, concluded that the determination of the
amount of front pay was within the court's discretion rather
than the
Dominic asserted on appeal that the amount
of front pay was a factual issue t o be decided by the jury?
The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the determination
of the amount of front pay is properly made by the judge?
The Dominic court found support in the ADEA's statutory
language and legislative history for its conclusion that judges
should determine the amount of front pay awards in ADEA
The court identified two types of relief provided for in
the statute." The first type of relief is that of "amounts owing," which includes "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime c~mpensation."~'The second type of relief consists of
Cir. 1991) (district court did not err in failing to instruct jury on determination of
amount of front pay; "[Iince reinstatement and prospective damages are equitable
in nature, the court had no obligation to instruct the jury on these remedies");
Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988) (case remanded to district court for judge to reconsider amount of front pay awarded);
Spivak v. Coulter Elec., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating in
dictum that the amount of front pay would be within the judge's equitable discretion).
60.
822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1987).
61.
Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1991).
62.
Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1253.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 1253-54.
Id. at 1257.
66.
Id. at 1258.
67.
Id. at 1256-57.
68.
69.
Id. at 1257.
70.
29 U.S.C.5 626(b) (1982). The remedial provisions of the ADEA are as
follows:
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"such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the ADEA]" including reinstatement.?'
The statute provides for "a trial by jury of any issue of fact
in any such action for recovery of amounts owing . . . regardless
of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such act i ~ n . " ?The
~ statute is silent, however, with respect to a jury
trial when courts consider granting other "legal o r equitable
relief." According t o the Dominic court, this indicates that
"facts relevant to a plaintiffs legal recovery, [i.e.] 'amounts
owing,' are to be tried by a jury even if equitable relief is also
sought, but that issues concerning equitable relief are not to be
tried by a jury."73 The court explained that the language of
the statute demonstrates Congress's intent to maintain the
Seventh Amendment's distinction between legal and equitable
claims which provide the framework for the duties of the judge
and the

Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall
be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of sections 16 and 17 of this title: Provided, That liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this
chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall
have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief a s may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
71.
Id.
72.
Id. 8 626(c)(2) (emphasis added).
Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1257. In adopting this interpretation, the court re73.
jected the alternative "interpretation that whenever some legal relief is sought, all
factual issues in the action are to be tried by a jury." Id.
74.
Id. The court explained, see id., that the legislative history of the ADEA
supports this interpretation:
The House Conference Report (Report) indicates that the term "amounts
owing-the first type of remedy-was understood to mean "items of pecuniary or
economic loss such a s wages, fringe, and other job-related benefits" and "liquidated
damages." H.R. REP. NO. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.AN. 504, 528, 535. Note that these are damages which are retrospective
in nature. Front pay, on the other hand, is a prospective remedy; accordingly, an
award of front pay is not an "amount owing" for purposes of section 626(b). See
Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1210 (7th Cir. 1989).
Congress explicitly provided for a jury trial when dealing with "amounts owing"
under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 8 626(c)(2) (1982), and the language of the Report indicates that members of the House Conference Committee understood the significance
of providing for a jury trial: "Because liquidated damages are in the nature of
legal relief, it is manifest that a party is entitled to have the factual issues underlying such a claim decided by a jury." H.R. REP. NO. 950, a t 13-14 (emphasis
added). The Report, as well as the ADEA itself, is silent with respect to jury trials
regarding the second type of relief-"such
legal and equitable relief a s may be
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The court further asserted that this is a "common sense
result," since there is a good deal of overlap between the facts
relevant to deciding whether to award front pay and the facts
relevant t o deciding the amount of front pay t o award.75The
court reasoned that dividing the fact-finding duties could lead
t o inconsistent decisions by the judge and the
Therefore, the court concludes, the determination of the amount of
front pay is a matter within the trial judge's equitable discretion.??

2. A problem with the reasoning in Dominic: No resolution of
the legal versus equitable dichotomy
The issue of who should make the determination of the
amount of front pay turns on whether front pay is legal or
equitable in nature. If it is "equitable," it is an issue for the
judge;?' if it is 'legal," it is for the jury.?' The Dominic court
never reaches the question of whether front pay is a legal or
equitable issue. Instead, it simply assumes that it is equitable.
This assumption is manifest in the court's analysis, which
focuses on "amounts o~ing."'~
The court notes that the statute provides for a jury trial on
the facts relevant t o a plaintiffs recovery of "amounts owing."' This, the court states, is evidence of Congress's intent

appropriate."
A fair reading of the ADEA and of the accompanying legislative history in'dicates that Congress intended "to comply with the seventh amendment by providing for a jury trial of factual issues underlying [ADEA] claims." Dominic, 822
F.2d at 1257. In addition, there is no evidence that Congress intended to provide
for a jury trial for equitable relief under the ADEA. Id. Instead, it appears that
Congress intended to maintain "the traditional distinction between legal and
equitable claims embodied in the seventh amendment." Id. This conclusion is
buttressed by Congress's insistence on the availability of "a trial by jury for any
issue of fact in . . . an action for amounts owing . . . regardless of whether equita626(c)(2) (1982)
ble relief is sought by any party in such action." 29 U.S.C.
(emphasis added). Congress's insistence that a jury trial be available despite the
possibility that a court might face equitable issues in an ADEA case indicates
Congress's understanding of the legal versus equitable dichotomy. Dominic, 822
F.2d at 1257.
75.
Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1257.
76.
Id.
77.
Id. at 1258.
78.
Cf. K e ~ e t hVinson, Artificial World of Law and Fact, 11 LEGALSTUD.F.
311 (1987) (discussing the classification of remedies as either legal or equitable).
Id.
79.
80.
Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1257-58.
81.
Id. at 1257.
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to provide a jury trial in keeping with the requirements of the Seventh Amendment.82From there, the court jumps to an explanation of how requiring judges t o decide whether t o permit
front pay and allowing juries to determine the amount of front
pay divides the fact-finding dutied3 Finally, the court concludes that front pay is an equitable remedy within the discretion of the judge.84 The court reaches this conclusion without
squarely deciding whether front pay is legal or equitable in
nature. Hence, the court never reaches the dispositive .
issue-whether front pay is an equitable or legal remedy.

C. An Attempt to Solve the Legal Versus Equitable
Dichotomy: Duke v. Uniroyal
1. The analysis in Duke v. Uniroyal

The Fourth Circuit addressed the question of whether front
.~~
pay is a legal or equitable remedy in Duke v. U n i r ~ y a lThe
court began by stating that the question of who should determine the amount of front pay depends upon whether it is a
legal or an equitable remedy? The Fourth Circuit, quoting
from Curtis v. Loether, said that money damages were the
traditional " 'form of relief offered in the courts of law."'87
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that money dam-

Id.
Id. The court warns that splitting the fad-finding duties
would be anomalous and would risk inconsistent decisions. A jury might
conclude that the employee would never find other work and award a
large sum in front pay, while the judge found that he or she would find
work immediately and that no award was appropriate. Or, a judge might
find front pay appropriate, but the jury might award only a nominal sum
based on its belief that the employee could secure immediate employment.
Id.; accord Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1991);
Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985). Contra Gibson
v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
The risk of inconsistent outcomes should not be sufficient, however, to overcome
the traditional functions of judge and jury. " 'Maintenance of the jury as a factfinding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history that
any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care.' " Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959)
(quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
84.
Dominic, 822 F.2d a t 1258.
85.
928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991). The Fourth
Circuit's decision in Duke v. Uniroyal is apparently the only federal circuit decision
directly addressing the issue of whether front pay is a legal or equitable remedy.
86.
Id. a t 1424.
87.
Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.189, 196 (1974)).
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ages are not always legal in nature. The court elaborated by
quoting from Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, which holds
that money damages may be a type of equitable relief if they
are " 'restitutionary' or 'incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief.' "" And finally, the Fourth Circuit compared
front pay under the ADEA to back pay under Title VII, which
has been held to be equitable in nature.8g The court determined that the two remedies were analogous since both have a
"restitutionary nature."g0Therefore, the court reasoned, front
pay under the ADEA should be treated as an equitable
remedy-the same as back pay under Title VILgl
2. The flaws in the analysis of Duke-v. Uniroyal

The analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Duke v. Uniroyal has
three flaws: the suggestion that front pay is restitutionary, the
analogy of ADEA front pay to Title VII back pay, and the proposition that front pay is "incidental to or intertwined with"
equitable relief.
a. First flaw: Front pay equated with "restitution." The
first flaw, the assertion that front pay is restitutionary in nature," is based on a misuse of the term "restitution." The
Supreme Court explained that "[rlestitution is limited t o 'restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which
rightfully belongs to [another].' "93 Likewise, restoring the status quo is the basis of the "make whole" standard of relief in
employment discrimination actions.94However, the status quo
in the law of restitution and the status quo in an ADEA action
are not the same thing.
Restitution serves to return something to its rightful ownerY5 It prevents an unjust enrichment. "A person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required t o

88.
Id. (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-71
(1990)). Note that the quoted material attributed to Chauffeurs Local No. 391 is
actually from Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987).
89.
Duke v. Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at 1424.
Id.
90.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (quoting Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946)).
94.
See discussion supra part IIA.
95.
State v. Barnett, 3 A.2d 521, 525-26 (Vt. 1939) (theft case).
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make restitution to the ~ t h e r . " ' ~Restitution restores the status quo by returning a benefit,'? unjustly conferred upon another, to its rightful owner. For example, a n action to compel
the "disgorgement of improper profits" is restit~tionary.~'
I n an ADEA action, the status quo is restored by returning
a n aggrieved employee to the same economic position she
would have occupied but for the wrongful discharge." This is
accomplished by reinstating her to her former position of employment or by granting her money damages, such as front
pay.loOConsequently, the employee is restored to her rightful
economic position. Her employer, however, was not unjustly
enriched. Unjust enrichment occurs when one has retained
money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.''' The employer does not "retain" something belonging to
the employee. The employer, therefore, does not make restitution t o the employee when he is forced to reinstate the employee or to pay her front pay due to the wrongful discharge. Thus,
front pay is not equivalent to restitution and equating front
pay to restitution in order to find that front pay is equitable i n
nature is improper.
b. Second flaw: front pay analogous to back pay. The
~ ~ the
Fourth Circuit's second flaw in Duke v. U n i r ~ y a l 'was
analogy of ADEA front pay to Title VII back pay, which is a n
equitable remedy.lo3 The court believed the two types of
awards were analogous for two reasons. The court's first reason
is that back pay under Title VII is restitutionary in nature?
As was explained above, front pay in ADEA actions is not

96.
97.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION $ 1 (1937).

The Restatement of the Law of Restitution defrnes a "benefit" as follows:
A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services beneficial to or a t the request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the other's
security or advantage.
Id. $ 1 cmt. b, at 12.
98.
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987).
99.
Flanagan, supra note 15, at 187.
100.
Id. at 207-08.
101.
Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923, 927 (Ohio 1938); see also Conkling's
Estate v. Champlin, 141 P.2d 569, 570 (Okla. 1943); Tulalip Shores, Inc. v.
Mortland, 511 P.2d 1402, 1404 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
102.
928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991).
103.
Id. at 1424.
104.
Id.
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restitutionary in naturelo5 since it does not represent an
employer's return to the employee of an unjust enrichment.
Furthermore, back pay represents wages which the employee
should have received and were, therefore, "due and owing."
Front pay represents wages yet unearned and, necessarily,
speculative in nature.
The court's second reason for its analogy of ADEA front
pay to Title VII back pay is that the decision whether to grant
either of the awards is left to the decision of the trial court.lo6
While this is true, it does not further the analysis of the nature
of the front pay award. This is especially true since front pay is
actually a secondary, or default, award. It is granted only if reinstatement of a n employee is not feasible.''' Consequently,
the judge does not really choose from among the many remedies available to her when determining whether to award front
pay; instead, she is forced to consider it when reinstatement,
a n equitable remedy, fails to fit the needs of the ADEA claimant.
c. Third flaw: front pay "incidental to or intertwined with"
equitable relief. The Fourth Circuit's third flaw in its analysis
i n Duke u. U n i r ~ ~ aarises
l ' ~ ~from its assertion that an award
of money damages-in this case an award of front pay-may be
equitable in nature if it is "'incidental to or intertwined with
injunctive relief.' "'Og This assertion has two problems.
(1) Front pay is not %xidental to or intertwined with"
equitable relief. Front pay in ADEA actions is not incidental to
or intertwined with equitable relief. Instead, front pay is given
in lieu of equitable relief (reinstatement) when the equitable
relief is not an appropriate remedy.ll0 These two types of
awards, front pay and reinstatement, are mutually exclusive,
not intertwined remedies. Hence, front pay is not awarded
when reinstatement of a n employee is feasible.
(2) The clean-up doctrine. More problematic, however,
is the Fourth Circuit's contention that the nature of money
damages changes from "legal" to "equitable" when those money

105.
See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
106.
Duke v. Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at 1424.
107.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
108.
928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991).
Id. at 1424 (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570
109.
(1990)). Note that the quoted material attributed to Chauffeurs Local No. 391 is
actually from Tu11 v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987).
110.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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damages are granted " 'incidental to or intertwined with' " equitable relief."' The result of this change in character is that a
claimant may be denied his right to a jury trial since the remedy is characterized as equitable rather than legal in nature.l12 This problem is a manifestation of the "clean-up doctrine."
Prior t o the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,'l3 suits in equity and suits at law proceeded separately.l14 Claimants seeking both equitable and legal forms of
relief from the same underlying facts usually had t o pursue an
action in equity and another action at law.'l5 The clean-up
doctrine allowed a court of equity to dispose of legal issues in
cases having both legal and equitable issues. This occurred
when an action was predominantly equitable in nature but also
gave rise to some legal relief which was "incidental to the equitable relief that the plaintiff s~ught.""~In such cases, the
courts of equity would dispose of both the equitable and legal
issues. Consequently, claimants were denied the opportunity to
have these legal issues decided by a jury.
The Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the distinction
between legal and equitable actions."' Instead, the Rules require that all claims arising from a single set of circumstances
be raised in a single pro~eeding."~In addition, Rule 38(a)
provides that "[tlhe right of trial.by jury as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by statute
of the United States shall be preserved to the parties invio- late."llg The Rules, therefore, seemed to provide for a jury trial on all legal claims. In spite of the Rules' provision for jury
trials, some confusion arose as to whether a jury trial was

111.
Duke v. Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at 1124 (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. at 570 (1990)). Note that the quoted material attributed to Chauffeurs Local No. 391 is actually from Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424
(1987).
Cf. Vinson, supra note 78, at 311-13.
See FED. R. CW. P. 86(a).
5 JAMESW. MOOREET AL., MOORE'SFEDERAL
PRACTICE
$ 38.03 (2d ed.

Id.
Id.
See FED. R. CW. P. 2.
See id.; FED.R. CW. P. 8.
FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a).

722

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW El992

permitted in cases in which the clean-up doctrine was previously applied. 120
The Supreme Court addressed this confusion regarding the
vitality of the "clean-up doctrine" in Beacon Theatres v.
Westo~er.'~'There, the Court indicated that the right to a jury trial
"cannot be dispensed with, except by the assent of the parties
entitled to it, nor can it be impaired by any blending with a
claim, properly cognizable a t law, of a demand for equitable
relief in aid of the legal action or during its pendency." This
long-standing principle of equity dictates that only under the
most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view
of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now
anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost
through prior determination of equitable claims.'22

The Court continued this analysis in Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood,lB where it emphasized that
[Beacon Theatres], of course, applies whether the trial judge
chooses to characterize the legal issues presented as "incidental" to equitable issues or not. Consequently, in a case such as
this where there cannot even be a contention of such "imperative circumstances," Beacon Theatres requires that any legal
issues for which a trial by jury is timely and properly demanded be submitted to a jury.'"

The Supreme Court in Dairy Queen virtually eliminated the
possibility for a legal remedy to be recast as an equitable remedy merely because it is "incidental to or intertwined with" a n
equitable remedy.125Therefore, front pay cannot be characterized as an equitable remedy simply because it is related to the
equitable remedy of reinstatement. If front pay is legal in nature, it remains legal in nature. Of course, this begs the question: Is front pay properly characterized as a legal remedy
which entitles an ADEA plaintiff to a jury trial?

120.
See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U S . 469, 472-73 (1962).
121.
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
122.
Id. at 510-11 (quoting Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891)) (emphasis added).
123.
369 U.S. 469 (1962).
124.
Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
125.
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
$ 11.5 (1985).
JACKH.FRIEDENTHAL
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V. ADEA FRONTPAYIS A LEGALREMEDY
THATENTITLES
ADEA PARTIESTO A JURYTRIAL
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial
as it existed at common law: "In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be pre~erved."'~~
The phrase "suits at
common law" has been interpreted to mean suits in which legal
rights are to be adjudicated, "in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone [are] recognized, and equitable
remedies [are] ad~ninistered."'~'The analysis of "suits at common law" also applies to causes of action which are created by
Congress.lB
The Supreme Court's two-part test for determining whether a statutory action is legal in nature was articulated in Tull
v. United States:129
To determine whether a statutory action is more similar to
cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in
courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine both
the nature of the action and of the remedy sought. First, we
compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought
in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of
law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and
determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.lgO

126.
U.S. CONST.amend. VII.
127. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830), quoted in Chauffeurs
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990).
128.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). "We recognize, of course, the
'cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.' "
Id. at 192 n.6 (quoting United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,
369 (1971)). A determination that the ADEA does not clearly provide for a jury
trial on the issue of the amount of front pay was made above. See supra part

1V.B.
129. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
130. Id. at 417-18. In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970), Justice
White had indicated that a three-part test should be used: "the 'legal' nature of an
issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to
such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries."
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have eliminated the third part of Justice
White's test but retained the first two parts. See, e.g.; Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (unanimously approving the use of only the twopart test in this case).
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The first part of the test focuses on whether there was a
common law equivalent to the statutory action at hand-an
ADEA action. A review of common law actions in 1791 reveals
that there was no proceeding equivalent to an ADEA suit for
The fact that
unlawful age discrimination in employ~nent.'~~
an analogous action at law did not exist in 1791 is not dispositive. The Seventh Amendment "requires trial by jury in actions
unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves
rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an
action at law, rather than in an action in equity or admiralty."'" Therefore, the outcome of the test is not dictated by
an "abstruse historical" search for a common law analogue t o
an ADEA action.'33
The second part of the test is concerned with whether the
remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature. The Supreme
Court determined that the nature of the relief sought is more
important than fmding a precisely analogous common law
cause of action..la An action for money damages was "the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law."ls5 In fact,
the Supreme Court has held that "insofar as the complaint requests a money judgment it presents a claim which is unquestionably legal."136Of course, front pay is in the form of money
damages. The fact that front pay is not available under the
ADEA until the equitable remedy of reinstatement fails should
not affect the determination that front pay is legal in nature.
The proposition that juries should be permitted to determine the amount of front pay in ADEA proceedings is buttressed by the Supreme Court's discussion in Beacon Theatres
v. West~ver.'~'In that case, the Court emphasized the importance of the right to a jury trial, stating that "[mlaintenance of
the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occu-

131. See 5 MOORE
ET AL., supra note 114, $ 38.11[5] (listing actions formerly a t
law); id. 8 38.11(61 (listing actions formerly in equity). But see Kolb v. Goldring,
Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 871-72 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1977)) (ADEA action is identical to a common law suit for back wages).
132.
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974).
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard,
133.
396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)).
Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).
134.
135.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974).
136.
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476 (1962).
137.
359 U S . 500 (1959).
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pies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."ls8 Furthermore, the Court said
that the right to a jury trial cannot be assailed except "under
the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in
view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot
now anti~ipate."'~~
A final obstacle to allowing juries to determine the amount
of ADEA front pay has been suggested. The Fourth Circuit
opined that the determination of the amount of front pay is too
difficult a question for juries to handle.'" Another court reasoned that "if the jury is given the issue, it will be called upon
to define a frozen image from fluid circumstance^."'^^ Admittedly, the determination of the amount of front pay is difficult
and involves some impre~ision.'~~
However, determining the
amount of front pay to award an ADEA plaintiff is no more
difficult or speculative than determining the amount of an
award for personal injury, a determination routinely made by
juries.

VI. CONCLUSION
The ADEA provides for reinstatement of workers
wrongfUlly discharged on the basis of age. Since reinstatement
of wrongfully discharged employees is sometimes impossible or
impracticable, courts have awarded front pay in lieu of reinstatement in an attempt to "make whole" victims of age discrimination.
The federal courts of appeal agree that the decision of
whether to award front pay in lieu of reinstatement is within
the discretion of the trial court. The circuits split, however,
over whether the determination of the amount of front pay is
within the discretion of the trial judge or the jury. A majority
of the circuits hold that judges should make the determination.
The Seventh Amendment, however, indicates that the right
to a jury trial in legal matters is to be preserved. Because the
138. Id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
139. Id. at 510-11.
140. Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 429 (1991).
141. Chace v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 725 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Md. 1989).
142. Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 772 n.11 (3d Cir. 1989).
143. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1057 (1986).
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Supreme Court's decisions indicate that front pay is properly
characterized as a legal remedy, ADEA claimants should be
permitted t o have juries determine the amount of front pay in
ADEA proceedings.
B. Todd Bailey

